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OPINION OF THE COURT 
 
MCKEE, Circuit Judge: 
 
The Government of the Virgin Islands asks us to reverse 
a decision of the Appellate Division of the District Court of 
the Virgin Islands vacating the murder convictions of 
Blanche Finney and Frank Fonseca and remanding for a 
new trial. We are also asked to review that court's 
conclusion that the Attorney General of the Virgin Islands 
is not empowered to issue subpoenas in a criminal 
investigation after a defendant has been arrested and 
charged with a criminal offense. 
 
In their cross-appeal, the defendants argue that the trial 
court erred in failing to instruct the jury on the legal use of 
force to: evict a trespasser, preserve the peace, and perform 
a citizen's arrest. For the reasons that follow, we hold that 
the Appellate Division erred in granting a new trial based 
upon the trial court's purported failure to give a lawful 
violence instruction. Accordingly, we need not reach any 
additional issues or discuss the Appellate Division's dicta 




On the evening of January 23, 1994, Blanche Finney and 
Frank Fonseca fatally stabbed Khaalid Tariq. Tariq and 
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Blanche were at one time married, but divorced at the time 
of the stabbing. A detailed account of the circumstances 
surrounding that killing is set forth in the opinion of the 
Appellate Division of the Virgin Islands that is the subject 
of this appeal. See Fonseca v. Government of the Virgin 
Islands, 119 F. Supp. 2d 531, 532-3 (D.V.I. 2000). For our 
purposes, it is sufficient to note that at the time of the 
stabbing, Blanche Finney was romantically involved with 
Frank Fonseca. Blanche lived with her brother, Jesse 
Finney. Jesse and Blanche were both security guards at the 
hotel where they resided. Sometime during the evening of 
January 23rd, Tariq knocked on Blanche's door and 
demanded to speak with her. An altercation ensued 
between Tariq, Jesse, Blanche and Frank Fonseca during 
which Tariq was repeatedly stabbed. The stabbing occurred 
after some or all of the trio first hit Tariq with a police 
baton or "billy club," and tried to spray him with chemical 
mace. 
 
Thereafter, Blanche and Jesse Finney were arrested along 
with Frank Fonseca, and charged with first degree murder. 
Six months after the stabbing, Blanche was admitted to a 
local hospital for treatment of serious physical injuries 
unrelated to the stabbing of Tariq. During the course of her 
hospitalization, she made incriminating statements to her 
doctor. Those statements were transcribed in her medical 
record, and her doctor later related them to the prosecutor 
who issued an Attorney General's subpoena for the medical 
records. See, 4 V.I.C. S 601. 
 
Jesse Finney eventually pled guilty to third degree 
assault, but Blanche Finney and Frank Fonseca were 
jointly tried before a jury. The trial court initially appointed 
Edith Bornn to represent Blanche at trial. Although Ms. 
Bornn was "an eminently qualified and well respected 
lawyer," Fonseca, 119 F.Supp. 2d at 535, she had not 
previously handled a criminal case, let alone a homicide. 
Therefore, the court appointed Treston Moore to serve as 
co-counsel. 
 
During the course of the ensuing trial, the government 
sought to introduce the subpoenaed medical records 
arguing that they contained various admissions that were 
inconsistent with the defendants' claim of self-defense, but 
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the trial court sustained a defense objection to this evidence.1 
Although the court precluded the government from using 
this evidence in its case-in-chief, the court allowed the 
government to use it in rebuttal if Blanche testified. 
However, Blanche did not testify, and the records were 
never admitted into evidence. 
 
At the conclusion of the trial, defense counsel asked the 
court to instruct the jury on the law of self-defense, the 
right to resist, and the defense of habitation. Moore also 
requested instructions on defense of others (14 V.I.C. SS 42 
and 43), justification with regard to self-defense (14 V.I.C. 
S 927(2)), lawful violence (14 V.I.C. S 293(a)), and a private 
citizen's right to arrest and remove a trespasser. App. IV, 
pp. 1067-74. The court agreed to charge on self-defense 
and defense of another, but expressed some concerns about 
the remaining requests. The court was concerned because, 
although "lawful violence" negates criminal liability for 
assault and battery, the defendants were charged with 
murder. App. IV, p. 1106. After weighing the defense 
request, the trial court stated that it would only give the 
self-defense and justifiable homicide instructions, and 
instructed the jury on those two defenses after closing 
arguments. 
 
Attorney Moore had to appear in another courtroom on 
the morning that the charge was to be given. He was 
therefore absent for part of the closing arguments, and all 
of the judge's jury instructions. When he returned to the 
courtroom, he asked the court if it had instructed on lawful 
violence and the court assured him that it had given that 
instruction. In reality, however, the court had given 
instructions on self-defense, and justifiable homicide, but 
had not charged on lawful violence under 4 V.I.C.S 293(a) 
as Moore had requested during the charge conference. Co- 
counsel Bornn had been present for the entire charge, but 
she did not object to the charge the court gave. 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
1. Defense counsel argued that under 4 V.I.C.S 601, the Attorney 
General can only issue subpoenas before a person is arrested. Blanche's 
medical records were subpoenaed after she had been arrested. Defense 
counsel also argued that the medical evidence was privileged. 
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The jury convicted both defendants of murder, and they 
appealed to the Appellate Division of the district court. The 
Appellate Division ruled that failure to give a lawful violence 
charge under S 293(a) was reversible error. That court also 
agreed with the defendants' claim that Virgin Islands law 
did not empower the Attorney General to subpoena 
Blanche's medical records after her arrest. This appeal by 
the Government of the Virgin Islands followed. 
 
The government argues that the Appellate Division erred 
in stating that Virgin Islands law does not allow the 
Attorney General to subpoena evidence after an arrest, and 
in holding that the jury charge was erroneous. In their 
cross appeal, the defendants challenge "the [Appellate 
Division's] failure to charge the jury on the several theories 
of defense," requested at the conclusion of the trial. 
Appellants' Br. at 25. The defendants also ask us to affirm 







Before reaching the substance of these appeals, we must 
address the defendants' argument that we lack jurisdiction. 
Defendants argue that the government is not appealing a 
"final order" as is required under 28 U.S.C.S 1291. They 
note that 48 U.S.C. S 1493 -- authorizing appeals from 
prosecutions in a territory -- does not authorize the 
government to appeal a grant of a new trial in a criminal 
case. 
 
48 U.S.C. S 1493 provides: 
 
       The prosecution in a territory or Commonwealth is 
       authorized--unless precluded by local law--to seek 
       review or other suitable relief in the appropriate local 
       or Federal appellate court, or where applicable, in the 
       Supreme Court of the United States from-- 
 
        (a) a decision, judgment, or order of a trial court 
       dismissing an indictment or information as to any one 
       or more counts. . . 
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        (b) a decision or order of a trial court suppressing or 
       excluding evidence or requiring the return of seized 
       property in a criminal proceeding. . . 
 
        (c) an adverse decision, judgment, or order of an 
       appellate court. 
 
48 U.S.C. S 1493 (1999). The defendants also argue that the 
jurisdictional grant contained in 4 V.I.C. S 39(c) does not 
apply. That statute states, "the Government of the Virgin 
Islands may appeal an order dismissing an information or 
otherwise terminating a prosecution in favor of a defendant 
or defendants as to one or more counts thereof, except 
where there is an acquittal on the merits." Finally, 
defendants argue that although 48 U.S.C. S 1613a(c) (1993) 
grants us jurisdiction to review "final decisions" of the 
District Court for the Virgin Islands, the other provisions of 
Virgin Islands law set forth establish that a remand for a 
new trial in a criminal case is not a "final order" as is 
required for our jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. S 1291. 
 
We have, however, previously addressed this issue and 
resolved it in the government's favor. In Gov't of the Virgin 
Islands v. Charleswell, 24 F.3d 571 (3d Cir. 1994) we held 
that our jurisdiction over the government's appeal from an 
order of remand for a new trial is not predicated on 28 
U.S.C. S 1291. Rather, it arises from 18 U.S.C. S 3731. See 
Charleswell, 24 F.3d at 574. Section 3731 provides in part: 
"In a criminal case an appeal by the United States shall lie 
to a court of appeals from a decision, judgment, or order of 
a district court dismissing an indictment or information or 
granting a new trial after verdict or judgment, as to any one 
or more counts. . . ." We held that the phrase,"the United 
States," also applies to the government of the Virgin 
Islands. See Charleswell, 24 F.3d at 574, citing Gov't of the 
Virgin Islands v. Christensen, 673 F.2d 713, 716 (3d Cir. 
1982). 
 
We also concluded that our jurisdiction was not affected 
by whether the appeal was from the Appellate Division of 
the District Court, or the district court, itself, as "the 
language of 18 U.S.C. S 3731 provides no basis for holding 
that our jurisdiction varies depending on the capacity in 
which the district court sat." Charleswell , 673 F.2d at 574- 
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75, citing Gov't of the Virgin Islands v. Mills , 935 F.2d 591, 
595-97 (3d Cir. 1991). Accordingly, we have jurisdiction, 
and will address the merits. 
 
B. The Attorney General's Subpoena Power 
 
As noted above, the Appellate Division agreed with the 
defendants' assertion that the Attorney General of the 
Virgin Islands is not authorized to subpoena evidence after 
a defendant has been arrested and charged, but the court 
did not reverse the trial court on that basis. Rather, in 
reversing the trial court, the Appellate Division stated: 
"Although the Court finds that the government did abuse 
its power in issuing the subpoena afer Finney's arrest, we 
do not reach the issue of whether Finney suffered any 
prejudice as a result, since we reverse on other grounds." 
Fonseca, 119 F. Supp. 2d at 534 (emphasis added). The 
discussion of the Attorney General's subpoena power is, 
therefore, obiter dicta. It is not part of the holding, and not 
precedential. Inasmuch as we are reversing the Appellate 
Division's holding regarding the jury instructions, we need 
not review the Appellate Division's conclusion regarding the 
limitations on the Attorney General's subpoena power. 
 
Furthermore, Blanche did not testify at trial. Accordingly, 
she has waived any claim she may otherwise have had that 
her medical records were privileged. See Luce v. United 
States, 469 U.S. 38, 41 (1984) (finding harm to defendant 
"wholly speculative" where defendant chose not to testify to 
avoid impeachment from his prior convictions); United 
States v. Moskovits, 86 F.3d 1303, 1305 (3d Cir. 1996) 
(finding harm speculative where defendant, acting as his 
own counsel, elected not to testify to avoid conditions 
imposed by the trial judge on how to conduct his direct 
examination); United States v. Furst, 886 F.2d 558, 578 (3d 
Cir. 1989) (finding harm "entirely speculative" where 
defendant limited the scope of his direct examination of 
witnesses to avoid government's possible improper cross- 
examination of witnesses). 
 
C. Jury Instructions 
 
As noted above, the Appellate Division concluded that the 
trial court erred in not giving a lawful violence instruction. 
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The Appellate Division concluded that the defendants were 
entitled to that instruction under relevant provisions of 4 
V.I.C. S 293(a). That statute in part defines as lawful, 
violence used for: 
 
        . . . 
 
        (3) the preservation of peace, or to prevent the 
       commission of offenses; 
 
        (4) in preventing or interrupting an intrusion upon 
       the lawful possession of property, against the will of 
       the owner or person in charge thereof; 
 
        . . . 
 
        (6) in self-defense or in defense of another against 
       unlawful violence offered to his person or property. 
 
14 V.I.C. S 293(a) (2000).2 The trial judge refused to give a 
specific lawful violence instruction under S 293(a), and the 
parties now dispute whether Blanche's attorney made a 
timely objection. Consequently, the parties disagree about 
the appropriate standard of review. The government states 
that we must review for plain error. The defendants argue 
that our review is plenary. 
 
When a party has made a timely objection to jury 
instructions, we generally review for abuse of discretion. 
See Gov't of the Virgin Islands v. Isaac, 50 F.3d 1175, 1180 
(3d Cir. 1995); Cooper Distr. Co. v. Amana Refrigeration Inc., 
180 F.3d 542, 549 (3d Cir. 1999). In the absence of a 
timely objection, we review only for plain error. See Cooper, 
180 F.3d at 549. Under the latter standard, only those 
errors that "undermine the fundamental fairness of the trial 
and contribute to a miscarriage of justice" will be reversed. 
Gov't of the Virgin Islands v. Smith, 949 F.2d 677, 681 (3d 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
2. The omitted subsections of S 293(a) are not relevant to this appeal. 
They address parental violence administered in disciplining children 
(S 293(a)(1)), violence used "for the preservation of order in a meeting 
for 
religious or other lawful purposes, in the case of obstinate resistance to 
the person charged with the preservation of order" (S 293(a)(2)), and 
violence used in making a lawful arrest pursuant to"lawful orders of a 
magistrate or court," (S 293(a)(5)). 
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Cir. 1991), quoting United States v. Young, 470 U.S. 1, 16 
(1985).3 
 
The disagreement over the appropriate standard of review 
stems from the circumstances surrounding the court's 
charge. As noted above, Moore had to go to another 
courtroom during part of the closing arguments and all of 
the jury charge. Upon his return, he asked the trial court 
if it had given the lawful violence instruction, and the court 
assured him that it had.4 The Appellate Division concluded 
that Moore's inquiry was sufficient to preserve an objection 
to the charge and afforded the jury instructions plenary 
review as to Blanche's appeal. However, inasmuch as 
Fonseca's lawyer did not object, the court reviewed his 
challenge to the jury instruction for "plain error." Fonseca, 
119 F.Supp. 2d at 535. 
 
We agree that Moore did not waive his objection to the 
jury charge. He initially requested such a charge, and 
thereafter clearly attempted to get clarification from the 
court on whether the lawful violence instruction was given 
during his absence. The court assured him that it had 
been. These attempts to preserve the issue can not be 
negated by the fact that his co-counsel heard the charge 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
3. Where "the question is whether the jury instructions failed to state 
the 
proper legal standard, this court's review is plenary." Isaac, 50 F.3d at 
1180. 
 
4. The following exchange occurred: 
 
       ATTORNEY MOORE: Your Honor, in the lawful violence, 393, 
       Subsection 4, it talks about the ability of a person to use 
reasonable 
       force to protect property or to -- 
 
       THE COURT: yes, yes yes, 
 
       ATTORNEY MOORE: Did you give that? 
 
       THE COURT: Yes. 
 
       ATTORNEY MOORE: Very well, Your Honor. 
 
App. IV, p. 1284 (Moore was apparently referring to section 293, not 393 
of Title 4. See, 4 V.I.C. S 293(a)). The court no doubt did believe that 
it 
had adequately addressed that charge and (as we discuss below), we 
believe the charge that was given was sufficient to inform the jury about 
the lawful use of deadly force. 
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and did not object. After all, Moore was appointed precisely 
because his co-counsel lacked experience in criminal 
matters. There is an obvious unfairness in recognizing that 
Ms. Bornn did not have sufficient experience to adequately 
represent Blanche and appointing Moore as co-counsel on 
the one hand, and then concluding that Bornn waived an 
objection despite her more experienced co-counsel's efforts 
to preserve it on the other. However, even though we agree 
that the objection was not waived, we do not agree that the 
charge that was given was erroneous. 
 
The Appellate Division reasoned that the evidence 
supported a lawful violence instruction, and concluded the 
trial court's failure to give one under S 293(a), was 
reversible error. The court stated: 
 
        The lawful violence instruction in this instance was 
       crucial to both appellants' defenses. With the 
       appellants having raised the argument that their 
       actions were committed in self-defense, the government 
       had the burden of disproving beyond a reasonable 
       doubt their claims of self-defense. By not including the 
       lawful violence instruction, the trial court did not put 
       the government to its burden before the jury and as a 
       result, the appellants' due process rights were violated. 
       Without question, the error had an unfair prejudicial 
       impact that seriously affected the . . . integrity of the 
       trial. The Court finds that the trial court's failure to 
       give the lawful violence instruction was plain error, 
       which inclusively indicates that the trial court's 
       omission does not survive plenary review. Accordingly, 
       the Court will vacate the convictions of both appellants 
       and remand for new trial. 
 
Fonseca, 119 F.Supp 2d at 535-6 (internal quotation marks 
and citations omitted). 
 
As a general principle, "a defendant is entitled to an 
instruction as to any recognized defense for which there 
exists evidence sufficient for a reasonable jury to find in his 
favor." Isaac, 50 F.3d at 1180, quoting Mathews v. United 
States, 485 U.S. 58, 63 (1988). So long as the evidence 
presented at trial reveals a basis for the defense, a court 
may not refuse a defendant's request for an instruction on 
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that defense. See Gov't of the Virgin Islands v. Robinson, 29 
F.3d 878, 882 (3d Cir. 1994); Gov't of the Virgin Islands v. 
Salem, 456 F.2d 674, 675 (3d Cir. 1972). Conversely, a trial 
court need not instruct the jury on any principle that does 
not have a factual basis in the evidence. See Bird v. United 
States, 187 U.S. 118, 132-33 (1902). 
 
Virgin Islands law sets forth overlapping, yet distinct, 
defenses to a homicide prosecution. For example, any and 
all of the following statutes define conduct that can 
arguably be referred to as "lawful violence": 14 V.I.C. 
S 293(a) ("lawful violence"), 14 V.I.C.SS 41 and 43 ("self- 
defense"), 14 V.I.C. S 926 ("excusable homicide"), 14 V.I.C. 
SS 927(2)(A) & (B) ("justifiable homicide"). See Isaac, supra 
(discussing distinctions between various defenses to 
homicide prosecution under Virgin Islands law). The 
Appellate Division, however, limited its discussion to 
instructions on lawful violence under 14 V.I.C.S 293(a), 
and that is all the defendants have argued on appeal. 
Accordingly, we need only consider the "lawful violence" 
instructions that may be required under that statute. That 
inquiry requires that we review each of the arguably 
applicable subdivisions of S 293(a) in context with the 
evidence produced at trial. In doing so, "we consider the 
totality of the instructions and not a particular sentence or 
paragraph in isolation." United States v. Coyle, 63 F.3d 
1239, 1245 (3d Cir. 1995). The instructions will be upheld 
if "the charge as a whole fairly and adequately submits the 
issues in the case to the jury." United States v. Thayer, 201 
F.3d 214, 221 (3d Cir. 1999), quoting United States v. 
Zehrbach, 47 F.3d 1252, 1264 (3d Cir. 1995). 
 
1. S 293(a)(3) 
 
The government concedes that the defendants "may have 
been entitled to a lawful violence instruction on this 
record," but argues: "the only part of that instruction that 
was requested, was supported by the evidence, and was not 
covered by other instructions was [subsection (3)], and the 
failure to instruct on this one clause was not plain error." 
Appellant's Br. at 44. However, as noted above, our review 
is not restricted to plain error. Inasmuch as Blanche 
preserved the objection, we must review for abuse of 
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discretion as to her appeal, but review for plain error as to 
Fonseca. 
 
Subsection 3 defines lawful violence to include violence 
for "the preservation of peace, or to prevent the commission 
of offenses," 14 V.I.C. S 293(a)(3). As noted above, the trial 
court indicated that it was not inclined to charge on lawful 
violence because the defendants were charged with 
homicide, not assault and battery. 14 V.I.C. S 293(a) is 
contained in Chapter 13 of the Virgin Islands Code. 
Chapter 13 is, in turn, captioned: "Assault and Battery." 
On the other hand, 14 V.I.C. S 927 is contained in Chapter 
45 of the Virgin Islands Code which is captioned: 
"Homicide." 14 V.I.C. S 927 establishes the defense of 
"justifiable homicide," and states that such justification 
includes resisting any attempt to murder any person, or to 
commit a felony, or to do some great bodily injury upon any 
person"14 V.I.C. S 927(2)(A) (emphasis added). 
 
The distinction between these two defenses is readily 
apparent. Section 293(a)(3) allows one to use violence to 
preserve the peace or prevent "commission of offenses," 
without further defining the offenses that justify resort to 
violence. However, S 927 restricts the offenses that justify 
resort to deadly force to felonies. Common sense, as well as 
the statutory scheme and headings, therefore suggest that 
one can only use the kind of deadly force at issue here to 
prevent the commission of a felony. A contrary reading 
would mean that someone could employ deadly force to 
thwart a petty theft, or even a summary offense. We do not 
believe that to have been the intent of the legislature in 
enacting S 293(a)(3). 
 
Nevertheless, the evidence here established that one or 
both of the defendants assaulted Tariq with a "billy club" 
and possibly chemical mace before he was stabbed. 
Therefore, there may well have been an issue in a juror's 
mind about the legality of that initial assault by the 
defendants, and that may have been relevant to the juror's 
view of the defendants' subsequent right to use force 
against Tariq. Nevertheless, assuming arguendo  that 
S 293(a)(3) is relevant in this context, the charge that the 
trial court gave adequately explained the governing legal 
principles and guided the jury's deliberations. The jury was 
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informed that the defendants had the right to use 
reasonable force to resist force being used against them. As 
we discuss below, the court's instructions correctly 
informed the jury of the circumstances in which the 
defendants could use deadly force, even if they were the 
initial aggressors. 
 
The defense's evidence at trial raised a classic issue of 
self-defense. The defendants attempted to show that Tariq 
had a propensity for violence; that he was the aggressor 
throughout the confrontation; appeared to be hiding a 
weapon in his rear pocket; and that the defendants had a 
reasonable and justifiable fear of him during this 
altercation, and took steps to defend themselves. The trial 
court instructed the jury accordingly. The court stated: 
 
        Ladies and Gentlemen of the Jury, also, if the 
       defendant had a reasonable ground to believe and 
       actually did believe that they were in imminent danger 
       of death or serious bodily harm and deadly force was 
       necessary to repel such danger, they would be justified 
       in using deadly force in self-defense, even though it 
       may thereafter have turned out that the appearances 
       were false. The defense hinges on the defendants' 
       subjective belief in imminent danger or death or 
       serious bodily harm and the objective reasonableness 
       of that belief. 
 
        . . . 
 
        You will note, too, that the defendants have raised 
       not only the issue of self-defense, but defense of 
       another or a third person. If a person reasonably 
       believes that force is necessary to protect another 
       person from what that person reasonably believes to be 
       unlawful physical harm about to be inflicted by 
       another and uses such force, then the person acted in 
       self-defense of another person. 
 
App. IV, pp. 1253-1260. 
 
These instructions guided the jury in deciding whether 
Finney's and Fonseca's actions were legally justified at each 
step of the confrontation. The jurors knew that the 
defendants had a right to defend themselves against an 
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assault or aggression on the part of Tariq and, on this 
record, that is all that S 293(a)(3) required. 5 
 
2. 14 V.I.C. S 293(a)(4) 
 
As noted above, a lawful violence instruction is also 
appropriate when there is evidence that the defendant used 
violence in the course of "preventing or interrupting an 
intrusion upon the lawful possession of property. . . ." 14 
V.I.C. S 293(a)(4). However, defendants never contended 
that Tariq attempted to enter Finney's home. The 
undisputed evidence, including the testimony of defendant 
Fonseca, is that Tariq knocked on the door, and Jesse 
opened it. Jesse then did retreat back into the room to call 
Fonseca, but Tariq remained outside, and he stayed outside 
in the hallway during the entire altercation. There is no 
evidence to suggest that Tariq tried to get inside. 
Accordingly, it was not an abuse of discretion to refuse to 
give a charge under subsection (4) of the lawful violence 
instruction. It was simply not supported by the testimony. 
 
3. 14 V.I.C. S 293(a)(6) 
 
There is, however, ample evidence to justify an 
instruction regarding the use of violence "in self-defense or 
in defense of another against unlawful violence offered to 
his person or property" under S 293(a)(6). That does not, of 
course, mean that the defendants were entitled to a 
formulation of subsection (6) of their choosing."A court errs 
in refusing a requested instruction only if the omitted 
instruction is correct, is not substantially covered by other 
instructions, and is so important that its omission 
prejudiced the defendant." United States v. Davis, 183 F.3d 
231, 250 (3d Cir. 1999) (emphasis added). 
 
In agreeing with the defendants' assertion that the trial 
court erred in not instructing under S 293(a), the Appellate 
Division failed to carefully consider the charge that the trial 
court actually gave. As set forth above, that charge 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
5. To the extent that the defendants are arguing that they had a right to 
use deadly force to keep the peace underS 293(a)(3), we reject the 
argument outright. 
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accurately and adequately explained defense of self and 
property on this record. In their cross-appeal, the 
defendants argue that the self-defense charge that was 
given was itself erroneous because "the Court erroneously 
imposed a duty to retreat on the Defendants and[this] 
must also be corrected on retrial." Appellees' Br. at 29, 
n.12. However, we do not believe that the instructions 
imposed such a duty, and the Appellees have not cited any 
specific language in the charge to support that assertion. 
The trial court did instruct the jurors: 
 
        If the defendants had a reasonable ground to believe 
       and actually did believe that they were in imminent 
       danger of death or serious bodily harm, and that 
       deadly force was necessary to repel such danger, they 
       were not required to retreat or to consider whether they 
       could safely retreat. They were entitled to stand their 
       grounds and use such force as was reasonable under 
       the circumstances to save their lives or to protect 
       themselves from serious harm. However, if the 
       Defendant could have safely retreated but did not do 
       so, their failure to retreat is circumstances under 
       which you may consider, together with all the other 
       circumstances, in determining whether they went 
       further in repelling the danger, real or apparent, than 
       they were justified in doing under the circumstances. 
 
        Even if the other person was the aggressor and the 
       defendants were justified in using force in self-defense, 
       they would not be entitled to use any greater force than 
       they had reasonable grounds to believe and actually 
       did believe to have been necessary under the 
       circumstances to save their lives or avert serious harm. 
 
        In determining whether the defendants used 
       excessive force in defending themselves, you may 
       consider all the circumstances under which they acted. 
       The claim of self-defense is not necessarily defeated if 
       greater force than would have seemed necessary in 
       cold blood was used by the Defendants in the heat of 
       passion generated by an assault upon them. A belief 
       which may be unreasonable in cold blood may be 
       actually and reasonably entertained in the heat of 
       passion. 
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        Generally, the right to use deadly force in self- 
       defense is not available to one who is the aggressor or 
       provokes the conflict. However, if one who provokes a 
       conflict thereafter withdraws from it in good faith and 
       informs his adversaries by words or action that he 
       desires to end the conflict, and he's thereafter pursued, 
       he is justified in using deadly force to save himself or 
       others from imminent danger or death or serious bodily 
       harm.6 
 
App. IV, pp. 1254-1260. 
 
Thus, the court mentioned "retreating" only to inform the 
jury that it could consider the defendants' ability to safely 
retreat along with all of the other circumstances in deciding 
if the defendants' use of deadly force was reasonable under 
the circumstances.7 The defendants ignore the fact that the 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
6. The jury was therefore correctly informed of the limited circumstances 
in which the defendants could resort to deadly force to defend 
themselves even if they were the initial aggressors. 
 
7. We do not intend to infer anything about whether Virgin Islands law 
imposes a duty to retreat before using deadly force. Our research has 
not disclosed any reported cases from the Virgin Islands discussing the 
duty to retreat in the context of using deadly force. In Isaac, we noted 
that "the Virgin Islands definition of excusable homicide restates the 
common law and is similar to excusable homicide statutes in Florida, 
California, and Mississippi." 50 F.3d at 1183. We also noted the 
similarity between justifiable homicide and excusable homicide in the 
Virgin Islands. See id. However, there is no uniform rule regarding the 
duty to retreat in the common law states we referred to. 
 
The Florida Supreme Court has recognized a duty"to retreat to the 
wall" if one can do so safely before using deadly force unless one is in 
his or her own home. See Weiand v. State, 732 So. 2d 1944, 1049 (Fl. 
1999) (explaining the common law origins of the"castle doctrine"). In 
Mississippi there is no duty to retreat so long as the one using deadly 
force is in a place where he or she has a right to be and was not the 
aggressor. "[I]n such [a] case, he may stand his ground and resist force 
by force, taking care that his resistance be not disportioned to the 
attack." Wade v. State, 724 So. 2d 1007, 1010 (Miss. App. 1998). 
California courts long ago rejected the common law principles underlying 
a duty to retreat. See People v. Zuckerman, 132 P. 2d 545, 549-0 (Cal. 
1942) ("California courts have definitely rejected the antiquated doctrine 
that a defendant will be justified in killing his assailant in self-
defense 
only after he has used every possible means of escape by fleeing, 
[including] `retreating to the wall.' "). 
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trial court specifically stated: "[the defendants] were not 
required to retreat or to consider whether they could safely 
retreat. They were entitled to stand their grounds  and use 
such force as was reasonable." App. IV p. 1257 (emphasis 
added). Accordingly, we hold that the trial court's 
instruction on self-defense substantially and adequately 
included the lawful violence specified in 14 V.I.C. 
S 293(a)(6), if it applies in the context of deadly force. 
Therefore, the trial court did not err in failing to give the 
"lawful violence" charge as requested. 
 
4. The Defendants' Cross-Appeal 
 
In granting the defendants a new trial, the Appellate 
Division stated: 
 
        The issue raised by both Finney and Fonseca that 
       requires a new trial is the inadequate instructions 
       given to the jury by the trial court on the defenses of 
       self-defense and justifiable homicide. Appellants argue 
       that they were entitled to additional instructions on 
       lawful violence, the right to use reasonable force to 
       remove a trespasser, the powers of arrest by a private 
       person, the right to resist, and the defense of 
       habitation. The court arguably included the instruction 
       on defense of habitation within its instruction on 
       justifiable homicide. (See App. at 1254). Of the 
       remaining allegations raised by the appellants, the 
       court's failure to include the instruction on lawful 
       violence causes the greatest concern. 
 
Fonseca, 119 F. Supp 2d at 534. The defendants now ask 
us to address issues in their cross-appeal that they claim 
the Appellate Division did not resolve. However, we decline 
to address any additional arguments in the first instance. 
Rather, we will remand to the Appellate Division so that it 
can address any additional claims of error. See Charleswell, 




For the reasons set forth herein, we will reverse the 
judgment of the Appellate Division and remand for 
proceedings consistent with this opinion. 
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